The egalitarian solutions for general cooperative games which were defined and axiomatized by Kalai and Samet, are compared to the Harsanyi solution. It is shown that axioms used by Hart to characterize the Harsanyi solution can be used to characterize the (symmetric) egalitarian solution. The only changes needed are the omission of the scale covariance axiom and the inclusion, in the domain of the solution, of games which lack a certain smoothness requirement.
Introduction
Axiomatic characterization of solutions for cooperative games has a long history, but until recently only solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility and bargaining problems have enjoyed axiomatic treatment. Lately, the axiomatic approach was applied to three solution concepts for cooperative games without transferable utility. Aumann (1983) provided an axiomatic characterization of the nontransferable utility (NTU) value introduced by Shapley (1969) . Hart (1983) , using axioms which are closely related to those of Aumann, gave an axiomatic definition of the Harsanyi solution (1959 Harsanyi solution ( , 1963 . Kalai and Samet (1983) defined and characterized axiomatically the family of egalitarian solutions for games without transferable utility.
The egalitarian solutions differ essentially from the NTU value and the Harsanyi solution. While the latter two solutions are covariant with utility rescaling applied separately to each one of the players, egalitarian solutions are not. As such, egalitarian solutions are said to admit interpersonal comparisons of utility.
The axioms used by Kalai and Samet are also different from those used by Aumann and Hart.
The monotonicity axiom used for the egalitarian solutions is a stronger axiom (when supported by a Pareto optimality axiom) than the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom which is shared (in different versions) by both the NTU value and the Harsanyi solution. Also, the additivity required by Kalai and Samet ('additivity of endowments') is of a different nature than the conditional additivity used by Aumann and Hart. The axioms of monotonicity and additivity of endowments used to characterize the family of the egalitarian solutions highlight the difference between these solutions and the NTU value and the Harsanyi solution since the latter solutions do not satisfy these axioms.
In this paper we demonstrate the similarities between the egalitarian solutions and the Harsanyi solution by showing that the symmetric egalitarian solution (from which the other egalitarian solutions can be derived by rescaling of utility) can be characterized by axioms used to define the Harsanyi solution. To this end we have only to drop one axiom, the scale covariance axiom, and to enlarge the domain of games on which the solution is defined by allowing games for which the set of feasible outcomes of the grand coalition, V(N), is not smooth. This axiomatization illuminates the differences and similarities of these two solutions and shows how narrow (albeit deep) is the gap between them. A possible interpretation of this result is that intrinsic interpersonal comparisons of utility, which are part of both the Harsanyi solution and the NTU value, are possible only when transfer rates for the grand coalition can be unambiguously determined (this is the case where V(N) is smooth), otherwise these comparisons should be externally given.
Preliminaries

Most of the notations and definitions follow Hart (1983).
A finite set N is the set of players. Each nonempty subset S of N is a coalition. X s= E Cr, TcS, ieT (E2)
Egalitarian solutions and the Harsanyi solution
Xs ~ 3 V(S).
Note that V has no symmetric egalitarian solution if and only if for some S either 
V(S) is empty or V(S)
contains
XSmcoi E ~T' TC_S, ieT
2)
Xs a v(s).
Here again V has no co-egalitarian solution if and only if for some S either V(S) is empty or V(S) contains the vector cco for each real c.
We remark that the co-egalitarian solution is related to the symmetric one by 
The axioms
The following axioms imposed on a possible solution function F defined on a space of games F are used to characterize the Harsanyi solution function on F1 by Hart (1983) . The games V and W in these axioms are arbitrary games (in F).
(A1) Scale covariance. F(AV)=AF(V) for each A>0 in ~N. (A2) Efficiency. For each x e F(V), x s e 0 V(S) for each S. (A3) Conditional additivity. If U= V+ W, xeF(V), yeF(W) and Xs+YseOU(S) for each S, then x + y e F(U). (A4) Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). If x eF(W) and for each S, V(S)c_ W(S) and Xse V(S), then xeF(V). (A5) Unanimity games. For each unanimity game (Jr, o F(Ur, c)= {z}, where z~= i c~ I T I if i ~ T c_ S and Zs = 0 otherwise. (A6) Zero inessential games. If for each S, OeOV(S), then OeF(V).
Theorem 4.1. (Hart, 1983) . The Harsanyi solution function is the only solution function on F 1 which satisfies Axioms A1-A6.
The main results
The smoothness of V(N) required of games in FI is essential for the characterization of both the Harsanyi solution and the NTU value; neither one satisfies conditional additivity on F0. (See Aumann, 1983 , for an example.)
The failure of Axioms A1-A6 to characterize a solution on F0 is not due to the conditional additivity axiom alone, but is rather a result of inconsistency of several axioms which we name in the following proposition. The smoothness of V(N) is closely related to the utilitarian part of the Harsanyi solution (H2) which requires maximization of total utility. Smoothness enables us to determine local transfer rates of utility between the players unambigously. Since admitting games which are not smooth in V(N) makes the axioms inconsistent, one may interpret it as the inconsistency of utilitarianism with the axioms. If we do not require utilitarianism, we are still left with equity or egalitarianism. But this requirement is not consistent with scale covariance. It is thus reasonable to delete one of the axioms causing the inconsistency: the scale covariance axiom. This intuitive argument is justified by the following theorem. It is possible to require that an egalitarian solution maximizes total welfare using the same exogenously given weights that are used for equating gains. We denote the solution function thus defined by G. More precisely, a payoff configuration X=(Xs)sc_N is in G(V) if and only if:
Xis >_ ~ yi for each S and each y e V(S). i~S i~S
The solution functions E and G are related to each other in the following theorem. Observe that this characterization differs from that of Kalai and Samet in that it does not define the whole family of egalitarian solution, but rather defines each egalitarian solution separately by changing appropriately Axiom A5. The weights that are nowhere mentioned in the axioms of Kalai and Samet are given here as part of Axiom A5-co, although their meaning as interpersonal utility comparisons weights is a result of the combination of A5-co with the other axioms.
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Consider the games V0, VI and V2 which are defined as follows: 
V°(N)= Ixe~'g i~N~ Xi<--INII' VI (N) = {X e [[P,N } x <--I N} , V2(N)= IxelRN ieN~ aixi<--lNIl
(S)c W(S) and Xs ~ V(S).
Clearly, for each S, Xs~OV(S) and thus x satisfies E2 for V. E1 is satisfied by x since x eF(W). (Observe that condition E1 is independent on the game.) The symmetric egalitarian solution for each unanimity game Ur, c is seen to be the one specified by Axiom A5 by choosing ~s=c/ISI and ~r=0 for T:gS. 
Vl(S)={xe~S[x<<_Xs},
for each S,
U°(S)=Ix~'s i~s~" xi<Ol'
foreachS.
By Proposition 6.1 in Hart (1983) , for every game Ue FTu, F(U)=H(U) and since for such a game H(U)=E(U) we conclude that F(U)=E(U). Since UoeFTu and E(U0) = {O} we find that F(U0) = {O}. By IIA, xeF (Vl) . But 
